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SELLING RECLAMATION WATER RIGHTS: A
CASE STUDY IN FEDERAL SUBSIDY POLICY
Joseph L. Sax*
It is the age old battle over who is to cash in on the unearned increment in land
values created by a public investment.-Harold L. Ickesl

federal reclamation program was designed to provide working farmers with irrigation water at prices they could afford:
The farmers got their water at low prices, but in the process they got
something else even more important-the right to continue to receive that share of water year after year.2 In the arid reclamation
states, assurance of a continuing, dependable supply of irrigation
water is an extremely valuable asset. A piece· of dry land may be
almost worthless, but that same tract with a reliable water supply
will generally be worth a substantial amount of money. Since the
worth of the water right is thus typically reflected in land values, one
who sells a farm in a reclamation project may also receive payment
for this valuable right. 3 Moreover, since the asset which is being
thus marketed was created by the investment of public funds in the
construction of the project,4 the effect is that the seller converts the
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1. DE Roos, THE THIRSTY LAND 167 (1948).
2. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 297 (1958); Ickes v. Fox,
300 U.S. 82 (1937); 32 Stat. 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1964).
3. See, e.g., a letter to the author from the manager of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District, Arizona, April 5, 1965, which reports that while "there
is no 'water right' sold with the land ••• the value of a right to receive water from the
District is of course reflected in the price of the land itself." Wellton-Mohawk is one
of many districts which operate on the model of a public utility, retailing water to
users on an annual contract basis. As the letter indicates, 1he opportunity to realize
water right profits exists in such situations just as it does on projects where the user
is viewed as having a more traditional sort of property interest in the water.
4. Misunderstanding sometimes arises·out of the calculatedly ambiguous claim that
"reclamation pays its way." This is true in the narrow sense that the construction
costs allocated to irrigation are required to be repaid. However, an examination of
the way in which these costs are repaid makes it indisputably clear that the reclamation investment is an enormous subsidy for the benefit of irrigation users. Under
standard reclamation law, construction costs. may be repaid over a forty-year period,
with no interest whatever. 53 Stat. 1193 (1939), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d) (1964). This period
may be preceded by a ten-year development period in which no repayment at all need
be made. Ibid. Moreover, during the repayment years, the obligation can be distributed so that most of the cost is not due until the later years. See, e.g., S. Doc. No.
92, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1964). Under another option in the law, certain costs
can be deferred indefinitely. 53 Stat. 1193 (1939), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(e) (1964). Finally
and perhaps most importantly, about 65% of the costs allocated to irrigation are
actually repaid by power revenues. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE FOR HOUSE COMM.
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECLAMATION-ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 52 (Comm. Print No. 1). For an example of how the subsidy.
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reclamation subsidy into cash, which he realizes as a private capital
profit at the expense of his successors on the project.
That this situation is no mere loophole in search of an opportunist, but is rather an existing problem of considerable proportions, can be illustrated by recent events on the well-known
Colorado-Big Thompson Project. The project area includes both
agricultural and municipal users, and because of significant urban
growth the limited supply of project water is much in demand. The
various users have an allotment which entitles them to receive a fixed
fractional share of the project's supply. There is an obligation to
repay construction costs to the United States, but, typically, the
terms are such as to reduce repayment to only a small fraction of
the original public investment. The water rights are thus provided
as a public subsidy but are held and sold, under current practice, as
a private asset. By latest report, municipalities within the project
were required to pay one hundred dollars to get the right to receive
an acre-foot unit of water out of the annual allotment. 0 When it
is considered that this district processed transfers of more than
eleven thousand acre feet of water during 1963-1964,6 the magnitude
of the potential- profit becomes obvious.
What is happening on the Big Thompson Project is perhaps
especially dramatic because water rights, as such, are openly bought
and sold and because the market is a relatively active and affluent
one. Nevertheless, precisely the same possibility of reaping a large
capital profit from the public investment can occur on any project
when a farm is sold at a gross price of which a significant portion
represents the value of the project water right. For example, one
irrigation district in Oregon recently reported that when project
water became available in 1961, land values increased from about
fifty dollars per acre to as high as two hundred fifty dollars per
acre. 7
operates, see the Department of Interior's presentation in Hearings on S. 912 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Lands, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 220
(1947).
It is assumed in the following discussion that free market sales of a commodity
provided by a subsidy will generally result in substantial profits to the seller. Where
that is not the case, and sales involve the mere recovery of payments made to the
United States, the proposal to be suggested here is self-adjusting, and such a seller
would not be penalized. See note 88 infra.

5. Boulder Daily Camera, May 12, 1964, p. I, col. 5. The price is even higher than
it seems, since in below-average years a unit will provide substantially less than one
acre foot of water.
6. [1963-1964] NORTHERN COLO. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST, ANN, REP. OF THE SECRE•
TARY MANAGER 5.
7. Letter to author from Secretary-Treasurer of Klamath Basin Improvement Dis•
trict, Oregon:, March 30, 1965;
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This situation raises some interesting questions about federal
reclamation policy and about subsidy policy in general. Why should
a program designed to give a needed service at reasonable rates
evolve into one where the original recipients, at the end of their
time of need, are also rewarded by the gift of a large capital asset?
Moreover, why should that reward be given at the expense of their
successors on the project, who, one would think, are equally the
concern of the reclamation program? These are the questions ·with
which this article will be concerned.

I.

THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of private profit-taking exists today b~cause the
federal government refrains from imposing price controls on the
sale of reclamation water rights. It refuses to attempt to prevent the
seller from realizing the so-called "incremental value" 8 which accrues when a farm acquired at dry-land prices is sold at a price
which incorporates the market value of the federal investment in
reclamation. That refusal is not based on the impossibility of such
a restriction, for similar restrictions have been employed in the
past. Indeed, one mystery with which we must deal is the ground
upon which the Department of the Interior, the administrator of
the reclamation laws, bases its refusal to act. Never fully articulated,
the Department's reasoning appears to rest upon some combination
of the following three reasons: First, and most important, Congress
does not want (or has prohibited) control of sales of water rights;
second, such restrictions are somehow inconsistent with the underlying purposes of reclamation policy and the private property system in which it operates; and third, even if such controls were
permissible and desirable, they are administratively impracticable.
The discussion which follows will consider and ultimately reject each of these reasons. It will conclude that Congress has not
prohibited such controls, that a rational reclamation policy demands them, and that they are practicable and should be implemented
forthwith. 9 Of all these issues, ascertaining the congressional attitude
8. As used here, "incremental value" means the market value of the right to receive project water. "In practice 'incremental value' has been defined as the amount
realized from the sale of land in excess of [the sum of] (1) original appraisal, (2) ap•
praised value of improvements, (3) construction charges paid and (4) twice the amount
of any previous payments to the district." U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY ON FEDERAL RECLAMATION PROJECI'S 48 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LANDOWNERSHIP
SURVEY].

9. The ,two statutory provisions which deal most closely with the rights of users
are in no sense determinative of the question at issue here. See 32 Stat. 389, 390
(1902), 43 U.S.C. §§ 431, 372 (1964). Moreover, it should be clear that merely because
a user may have a right to continue his use and not be cut off, 70 Stat. 483 (1956), 43
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is perhaps the most complex. The applicable statute seems, on its
face, to suggest that the reaping of incremental values is not to be
forbidden except in one special situation: the sale of large estates
-so-called excess lands. 10 However, this appearance conceals a
legislative view which, although twisted and shifting, is far more
sympathetic to the general prohibition of private profit-taking than
current administration would suggest. Our first task, therefore,
must be an analysis of the legislative history of control of incremental value sales.

JI.

EARLY HISTORY OF RECLAMATION LEGISLATION

The provisions of the original reclamation act, which came
fairly late in the history of the nation,11 clearly reflect the influence
of two important factors. First, the disposition of the public domain
had been plagued by monopolization and speculation, which had
continuously frustrated the underlying purpose of opening the federal domain to settlement-the creation of a class of self-reliant
family farmers. 12 To ensure that the reclamation program would
not be similarly frustrated, the framers of the 1902 act devised a
series of anti-monopoly and anti-speculation provisions. Chief among
them were the prohibition against the sale of reclamation water
rights for use on more than 160 acres in single ownership, the requirement that users be bona fide residents upon the land, and the
condition that reclamation water be appurtenant to the land.13 It
was thought that these three rules would prevent land monopolization and profiteering by large corporations to the detriment of the
intended beneficiaries of the act. 14
The second factor was a determination that reclamation should
carry its mvn weight to the extent possible. Thus, the law required
users to repay to the United States the capital investment in construction. Although repayment was to be without interest, the full
costs of construction were to be returned in ten years' time. 1G To
what extent repayment was a calculated new departure in the theory
of government aid and to what extent it was a political expedient to
U.S.C. § 485h-1{4) (1964), he does not necessarily also have the right to sell his use to
another for a profit. See Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U.
CoLO. L. R.Ev. 49, 64 (1964). It is only the latter alleged right with which we are concerned here.
IO. See 44 Stat. 649 (1926), as amended, 70 Stat. 524 (1956), 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1964),
11. 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (now codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
12. See LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY 61-73, 91.
13. 32 Stat. 389, 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. §§ 431, 372 (1964).
14. See Taylor, The Excess Land Law-Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J.
476, 484-86 (1955).
15. 32 Stat. 389 (1902).
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win the needed votes of midwestem congressmen is unclear and,
from today's perspective, irrelevant. In any event, a limited subsidy
concept in the form of a repayment obligation was built into the
basic fabric of reclamation law.
The inadequacy of the anti-speculation clauses and the unrealistic harshness of the repayment formula soon led to disaster. The
provisions so carefully designed to prevent profiteering in water
failed to take account of the fact that the economic value of the
water could and would be reflected in land values. Since there were
no adequate restrictions on land transactions, a fatal combination of
events took place.16 In the face of a rising market, landowners were
induced to refrain from selling in the hope that time would drive
real estate prices even higher. Since a good deal of the property was
held by owners of large tracts who could afford to wait and speculate,
much land was held off the market and not settled at all dm:;ing
the early years. This result was, of course, contrary to the congressional desire that the projects be settled and cultivated and that
the o,vners of the maximum amount of land begin repaying the
construction charges which had been expended. At the same time,
however, those lands which were put upon the market brought
enormous profits. The extent of the speculative excesses is indicated
by the fact that the average price increase on project lands during
the first decade of reclamation exceeded 750 per cent.17 This increase was nearly seven times the general rise in farm land prices
in reclamation states during the same period.18
The rate of economic failures created by the combination of
land speculation and a rigid repayment schedule was tremendous,
and the settlers naturally turned to Congress for relief. The precise
question was whether the repayment obligation should be reduced
in order to permit the settlers on the projects to survive :financially,
but at the same time to permit the selling lando,vners to reap their
profits.
In the context in which the problem arose, the solution appeared
easy. Those who had been profiting at the expense of the repayment
fund were principally large landowners and speculators whom there
was neither need nor desire to aid. They were merely parasites16. This history is reviewed in DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, STUDY PREPARED PURSUANT TO
REsoLUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR .AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D
SESS., ACREAGE LIMITATION PoucY 6 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as ACREAGE
LIMITATION PouCY]. These early developments are also discussed in the Landownership
Survey and in the report of the Special Advisors on Reclamation, Federal Reclamation
by Irrigation, S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. !}6-4-0 (1924).
17. 33 U.S. BUREAU OF R.Ecr.AMATION, THE RECLAMATION ERA 178-79 (1947).
18. Ibid.
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real estate manipulators who, without ever settling on or improving
the land themselves, reaped enormous profits from the enthusiasm
and naYvete of the true settlers to whom they sold. The need appeared to be merely to get the land into the hands of genuine settlers
with dispatch and at reasonable prices. Once that had been done
and the speculators had been squeezed out, the basic structure of
the reclam.ation plan could go forward as originally planned. The
true settlers would prosper, and the investment of the United States
would be once again secure.
JI!. HISTORY OF INCREMENTAL VALUE CONTROLS
A. Limited Attempt To Curb Speculative ExcessesPrice Control of Excess Land
It was with this background that Congress passed the Reclamation Extension Act of 1914.19 Its principal purpose was to grant a
permanent enlargement of the repayment period from ten to
twenty years, but it also made the first significant attempt to deal
with the problem of speculative excesses. As previously noted, the
task as it then appeared was "to cope with the special problem
of initially breaking up these excess holdings and preventing the
o-wners from capitalizing on the benefits of Federal construction
in the form of high prices charged to purchasers of their lands." 20
In pursuance of this goal, a number of provisions were enacted to
induce sales by making it burdensome and expensive to hold land
out of production. In addition, the requirement was added that, before construction began on any project, the Secretary must require
project landowners "to agree to dispose of all lands in excess of the
area which he shall deem sufficient for the support of a family upon
the land in question, upon such terms and at not to exceed such
price as the Secretary of the Interior may designate ...." 21 This
section provided the basic structure upon which subsequent incremental value provisions were built; it is therefore important to be
clear about its purpose. Notably, it did not represent a declaration
that the original bona fide settlers should have the benefit of incremental values for themselves. It was, rather, a negative law; it merely
provided that the speculators (owners of excess land) should not
have any such profit. The question with which we are concerneddistribution of profits in subsequent sales-was not before the
Congress in 1914. It was having enough trouble getting the first
generation started to worry about what might happen thereafter.
19. 38 Stat. 686 (1914).,
20. ACREAGE LIMITATION POLICY 7.
21. 38 Stat. 689 (1914), 43 U.S.C. § 418 (1964).
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Early Proposal for Broader Control Over
Incremental Profits

The problem of subsequent sales was not long in being raised.
For a vari~ty of technical reasons, it soon became obvious that the
measures taken in 1914 were not sufficient to alleviate the financial
difficulties of the reclamation projects,22 and in 1923 the President
appointed a panel of distinguished citizens to _make a comprehensive
_study of the program.
The report of this group,23 the so-called Fact Finders Committee,
is most interesting. It recognized for the first time that competition
for the benefits of the federally provided incremental values existed
not only bettveen "speculators" and "settlers," but also among bona
fide settlers themselves. As the Fact Finders noted, there would
inevitably be some turnover of reclamation lands. Many of the set~
tlers who had initially come on the project would eventually sell
out to succeeding settlers for a variety of legitimate reasons such
as death, ill health, or restlessness.24 The first settlers may have obtained their lands at low dry-land prices, but after the implementation of reclamation measures the lands had a market value inflated
by the presence of irrigation water. The selling settlers were reaping
this increment as a capital profit. Although these sellers, unlike the
"pure" speculators, were meant to be the beneficiaries of the federal investment, so were the buying settlers. To permit the selling
settler to reap the value of the water right as a profit meant that he
would do so at the expense of the buying settler, thus reducing the
financial stability of those persons subsequently coming onto the
project. The Report described the situation thus:
[T]he [transferring] farmer sold his equity in the farm unit
and the water contract at a price over and above the money he
had actually paid out. The purchaser was under the obligation of paying to the Government the usual annual installments, and in addition the premium paid to the former owner.
After several such transfers have occurred, each one at a price
above the cost to the previous owner, the ultimate purchaser
often carries an obligation to the respective purchasers which
overshadows in magnitude the obligations to the Government.
When the pressure of this heavy obligation weighs upon him,
he is likely to blame his condition on the Government reclamation plan, when, as a matter of fact, the project construction
and the operatio.n and maintenance charges are small compared with the other obligations that he has to meet. Such a
22. LANnoWNERSHIP SURVEY 42.
23. S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
24. Id. at 112-14.
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pyramiding of costs is most unfortunate, for it is nearly always
disastrous to the credit and to the peace of mind of the farmer. 2 G
The Fact Finders thus saw clearly the basic dilemma with which
we are principally concerned-the allocation of incremental land
values among successive generations of settlers on the project. It
is important to note, however, that the similarity between their
concern and ours is only partial. They saw a conflict between the
generations of settlers only to the extent that there was a threat to
the survival of the buyer and the secµrity of the repayment obligation. Implicit in this limited concern is the assumption that if the
buyer's security could be assured, it would be perfectly proper to
permit the seller to reap the incremental value. The soundness of
that assumption is at the very center of our concern here. We ask
the questions why, and under what financial circumstances, the
selling (earlier) settler should be preferred over the buying (later)
settler in the distribution of a publicly conferred benefit. This difference is critical because the assumption that financial security is
the sole consideration in determining· the role of incremental
profits pervades all congressional action, as we shall see, and gives
support to the claim made here that Congress never decided, and
never really considered, the issue with which we are concerned.
In any event, the Fact Finders did come to grips with their
discovery that speculation was not limited merely to the initial disposition of large landholdings. They drafted a bill regulating all
sales of all irrigable lands, both excess and non-excess, until all
construction charges had been paid. It provided that project lands
were to be appraised at their value without reference to the proposed project (in essence their value as dry land) and that "upon
any and every sale of the land or any interest therein" the seller
must turn over to the United States half of the amount by which
the sale price exceeded the appraisal price.26 The Fact Finders'
proposal itself did not become law, but twice in the next two years
Congress affirmed the principle that broad control over incremental
value sales should be exercised.
C. Legislation Extending Price Control to All

Project Land
Both the San Carlos Project Act of 192427 and the Interior Department Appropriation Act of 1925,28 which authorized a number
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 113; see also id. at 37.
Id. at 204-06; H.R. 8836, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
43 Stat. 475 (1924).
43 Stat. 1141 (1925).
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of projects, contained a requirement that no expenditures should
be made until a repayment contract had been executed containing
a provision for an appraisal, showing the present actual bona
fide value of all such irrigable land [all lands under the project]
fixed without reference to the proposed construction . . . and
[a provision] that until one-half the construction charges against
said lands shall have been fully paid no sale of any such lands
shall be valid unless and until the purchase price involved in
such sale is approved by the Secretary of the Interior ....29
This approach incorporated two highly significant changes from
that used in the 1914 Extension Act. First, the restriction was to be
operative until half the construction charges were repaid. Second,
it was worded to prohibit the taking of incremental profits not only
in the original sale of excess land to a settler, but also in subsequent
sales of project lands. 30 I£ the quoted requirement meant to accomplish what its language indicates, its enactment marked a milestone
in reclamation policy. Up to this time, as we have noted, congressional concern with speculation was limited to that period when
land was first being put into production. In contrast, however, the
1924 and 1925 .i.cts contain no such limitation. Their language
covers not only initial sales of excess lands, but also subsequent sales
between· settlers.
That this was the result intended seems corroborated by the·
element of the requirement which covered all sales until half the
construction charges were paid off. These charges were enacted
during the period in which Congress was enlarging the total repayment period to forty years; 31 indeed, at the time of the 1925 act
the operative repayment provision was indefinite in duration, with
annual payments being based upon a percentage of gross income.82
In light of these developments, it would seem to have been antici29. Authorization for the Yakima Project, Kittitas Division, 43 Stat. 1170 (1925).
The other authorizations contained provisions similar in scope, but not identical in
language. It should be noted that the San Carlos Project Act and the 1925 Appropriation Act differed from the Fact Finders' proposal in that a general power of control
over the purchase price in the Secretary was substituted for the specific requirement
that 50% of the increment be returned to the United States. T:he debate on the Fact
Finders' proposal suggests that the reason for ·this was not an objection to broad incremental value control as such, but rather skepticism as to whether the precise formula
urged by the Fact Finders (which failed, for example, ·to give credit to the seller for
improvements he had made) was fair. See Hearings on H.R. 8836 and H.R. 9611
Before the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
38-45, 314-41 (1924).
30. For example, the provision ordinarily would control a sale by a b,ona fide settler
who had worked the land for six or eight years and who had become ill or decided to
retire.
31. 44 Stat. 648 (1926), 43 U.S.C. § 423d (1964).
32, Section 4, subsec. F, 43 Stat. 702 (1924), repealed, 44 Stat. 650 (1926).
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pated that the sale-price restriction would be in effect for a very
long time and would probably apply to several resales of the project
lands.
However, this provision restricting sales until half the costs
were repaid cuts the other way, too. It is a limitation, and thus suggests some congressional reservations about denying the selling
settler incremental profits, even at the risk of losing some of the
repayment contracted for.
The two-edged aspect of the restriction is just the visible sign of
a tangled background of legislative indecisiveness of which we shall
see even more in .the history of subsequent statutes. 83 In any event,
despite some inconsistency, the 1924 and 1925 acts seem clearly to
represent a congressional willingness to impose broad and longlasting restrictions on incremental value sales.
D. Section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act-A Tangled
Piece of Legislative Draftmanship
The next events of interest took place in 1926, when Congress
passed two important laws. The first was the annual Interior Department appropriation law, which, like that of 1925, authorized
some specific reclamation projects.34 The second was the Omnibus
Adjustment Act,35 a reclamation law of general application which
is still in force. The statutes were enacted within fifteen days of
each other and contain identical anti-speculation provisions. The
relevant language, now best known as section 46 of the Omnibus
Adjustment Act, stated that henceforth contracts between the United
States and the users' associations must provide that:
[A]ll irrigable land held in private ownership by any one
owner in excess of one hundred and sixty irrigable acres shall
be appraised ... and the sale prices thereof fixed by the Secretary on the basis of its actual bona fide value ... without reference to the proposed construction . . . and that no such excess
33. It is noteworthy that 91e Bureau of Reclamation had no such reservations
about what ought to be done. During the hearings on the appropriation bill, the Com•
missioner of Reclamation put into evidence the repayment contract he proposed to use.
Hearings on the Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1926 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 68th Cong., 2d Sess, 533·36 (1924),
It provided in detail that an appraisal, excluding speculative values, was to be made
of "all district lands." Id. at 534. If any lands in the district were sold for an amount
in excess of the appraisal price, 50% of that excess would be payable to the irrigation
district to be credited on the construction obligation. The contract expressly provided
that it was to apply not only to the first sale to an eligible settler where profits would
be those of a mere land profiteer, but also to a "second sale, or third or additional
sale." Id. at 535.
34. 44 Stat. 478 (1926). Included were some reauthorizations of projects which had
been approved in the 1925 act.
35. 44 Stat. 636 (1926).

November 1965]

Selling Reclamation Water Rights

23

lands so held shall receive water from any project or division if
the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable
contracts for the sale of such lands under terms and conditions
satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and at prices not to
exceed those fixed by the Secretary of the Interior; and that until
one-half the construction charges against such lands shall have
been fully paid no sale of any such lands shall carry the right
to receive water unless and until the purchase price involved in
such sale is approved by the Secretary ....36
This provision is the successor to the 1924 and 1925 acts and is still
the principal anti-speculation provision in the reclamation laws. It
is, therefore, necessary to examine it in some detail. On its face,
section 46 seems to embody a dramatic change of policy from the
1924 and 1925 laws, and from the recommendations of the Fact
Finders, for it seems to reject the principle of general price control
and to limit such controls solely to sales of excess lands. If indeed
this was what Congress desired, it would explain the current administrative refusal to take action against private profit-taking in
the publicly created reclamation water values. Unfortunately, a
mere perusal of the face of section 46 is not enough; behind the
unexamined statutory wording lurks a grammatical and legal puzzle
of some complexity.
To solve that puzzle, it is first necessary to recall that anti-speculation provisions in the reclamation laws were of two types. One
was designed to accelerate the disposition of large landholdings;
the other was to control prices when lands were sold. The excerpt
quoted above from the 1925 law deals only with the second problem, price control.87 It requires the execution of a repayment contract between the Secretary and the water district agreeing that land
sales be subject to control by the Secretary. To the extent that the
1925 law concerned itself-with the problem of breaking- up excess
landholdings, it employed a quite different procedure described separately in the statute.38 That procedure required that an entirely
different contract be executed between the particular state involved
and the United States, in which the state undertook the "duty and
responsibility" of breaking up excess landholdings and securing
settlers to improve the land.39
The excerpt quoted above from the Omnibus Adjustment Act
36. 44 Stat. 650 (1926), 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1964).
37. Text accompanying note 29 supra. The same is true of the parallel portion of
the 1924 San Carlos Project Act. Section 4, 43 Stat. 476 (1924).
38. 43 Stat. 1169, 1170 (1925). The excess land provision is in the same long numbered section, but in a separate proviso.
39. The San Carlos Project Act dealt with excess landholdings by requiring that
the excess be conveyed to the United States. Section 4, 43 Stat. 476 (1924).
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of 1926,40 however, includes provisions £or breaking up excess landholdings and for controlling prices juxtaposed in the same sentence.
The reason is that Congress had decided by then to abandon the
experiment with state responsibility for excess lands and to revert
to the same device it used for price control-a contract between
the Secretary and the water district. As st consequence, the drafters
of the statute were able to consolidate and incorporate both antispeculation provisions within a single sentence. Thus the sentence
could be structured to, read:
[Such contract or contracts with irrigation ¢listricts hereinbefore referred to shall further provide . . .]
that no such excess lands so held shall receive water . . . if
the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable
contracts for the sale of such lands . . .
and that until one-half the construction charges against such
lands shall have been fully paid no sale of any such lands shall
carry the right to receive water unless and until the purchase
price involved in such sale is approved by the Secretary.
Ordinarily the details of sentence structure and the order of phrasing would be an utterly trivial matter, unworthy even of notice.
However, in this particular situation the consolidation may have
had a major impact on the administration of reclamation policy.
If we now tum back to the exact language of the 1926 law, the
relevance of the consolidation will become apparent. The words of
the earlier acts relating to restrictions on the sale price of lands"until one-half the construction charges against said lands shall
have been fully paid no sale of any such lands shall ..."-were
retained without significant change. However, in the 1926 law the
force-sale provision for excess lands was inserted ahead of the language relating to sale-price control. Physically this was a mere consolidation of two independent provisions, but grammatically a
crucial change occurred. Although the language of the sale price
provision remained the same, the referent of the pronouns changed
completely. Thus, though the provision still said-as it had in 1924
and 1925-"said lands" and "such lands," the lands to which "said"
and "such" refer seem to have changed. In the earlier laws the referent was as broad as it could be-all irrigable lands under the
project. In contrast, however, with the insertion of the excess land
clause in the 1926 laws, the referent, grammatically at least, was
now merely "all irrigable land held in private ownership by any
one owner in excess of one hundred and sixty irrigable acres."
40. Text accompanying note 36 supra.
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If the Congress meant, in fact, to accomplish what it thus grammatically accomplished, then the broad coverage of incremental
value sales in the legislation of 1924 and 1925 was substantially
narrowed, and only sales of excess lands would be regulated. Indeed, as previously noted, current administration imposes only this
v_ery limited restriction, at least in part because of the view that
the 1926 provision plainly states that only control of excess land sales
is intended.41 However, as we have just seen, it is quite possible that
the apparent restrictiveness of the 1926 provision is the result of
nothing more than a bizarre grammatical fortuity, 42 and that section
46 in no sense represents a congressional repudiation of broad
control of incremental value sales ..
In any attempt to resolve the question of the true meaning of
the 1926 provision, it should be determined whether Congress ever
indicated that it was changing the 1924 and 1925 laws or whether
the apparent grammatical certainty is simply the result of blind
41. The importance of § 46 to the formulation of administrative policy is somewhat uncertain. No doubt present policy is significantly influenced by congressional
acquiescence, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, in suggestions that incremental value
contracts covering non-excess lands should be repudiated and by the repeal of certain
statutory incremental value provisions. See note 52 infra. However, the repeals were
based on varying grounds, and in none of them did Congress indicate a desire to
repudiate the principle of § 46, which has always been viewed as embodying the
fundamental law. See note 64 infra.
There has also been a suggestion that broad control of incremental value sales
could be imposed without regard to the meaning of § 46 under the blanket authority
given ,the Secretary "to perform any and all acts and to make such 'rules and reguladons as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying ,the provisions of
this act into full force and effect." 32 Stat. 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1964). See
LANDOWNERSIDP SURVEY 48. However, :reliance on this section seems misplaced. If
Congress has spoken specifically on an issue and indicated that it does not want a
certain thing done, the executive branch certainly ought not to be allowed to do that
thing anyway on the basis of a general authorizing provision in the applicable statute.
Those who administe:r the reclamation acts, of all people, should be sensitive to the
relation between general language and specific language in the law. See Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291-92 (1958).
42. Whether the change was purposeful or inadvertent must :remain a matter of
speculation; the details of the change are most inconclusive. T\he origin of the language
that became § 46 was an Interior Department draft made in 1925. Re1LTings on the
Interior Department 1927 Appropriation Bill Before a Subcommittee of the Rouse
Committee on Appropriations, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 739 (1925). Oddly, this draft
omitted entirely ·the critical clause beginning "until one-half." That draft thus plainly
applied only to excess lands, notwithstanding the fact that all previous versions had
clearly applied to all irrigable lands and the Department itself had openly advocated
the broader coverage in hearings the preceding year. See note 33 supra. Moreover, in
presenting this 1925 draft, Commissioner Mead at no point indicated any change in
departmental policy. Hearings, supra.
To add to the mystery, the omitted clause, "until one-half •.• ," was apparently
reinserted by the House Appropriations Committee. See 67 CONG. ~c. 1507, 5782
(1926); H,R. REP. No. 37, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). Whether they added this language
to broaden coverage to non-excess lands or fo:r some other reason is not clear. It is also
unclear whether they inserted the phrase at the point they did because it had been
there in the 1924 and 1925 acts (when the excess land provision did not precede it), or
purposely to follow and be limited by the newly inserted excess land provision.
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chance. If Congress intended to narrow the earlier provisions, there
should be some evidence of that intent. In fact, however, an examination of the legislative history of the 1926 act shows it to be
wholly barren of any indication that the law was being narrowed.43
The only affirmative evidence available is to be found in contemporary administrative interpretation. In the report of the Bureau of Reclamation for the period ended June 30, 1926,44 which
was published more than a month after the signing of the Omnibus Adjustment Act, Commissioner Mead discussed the Vale Project
in Oregon. That project was first authorized under the broad language of the 1925 act and then reauthorized in 1926 under the
seemingly more restrictive language there used. 45 The Commissioner noted that under the 1925 law the project was made subject
to "appraisal of private lands to be benefited by the proposed works
with agreements for sale thereof at the appraised prices."46 Although
the 1926 statute had just been passed, there is no indication that it
was thought to have modified control of incremental value sales,
thereby narrowing the scope of regulation to transfers of excess
lands only. Moreover, it seems significant that the report speaks
expansively of "private lands" and not merely of excess land. Since
it was the Bureau of Reclamation which had recommended the
broad repayment contract, covering "all transfers" of "all district
lands," to Congress in the hearings on the 1925 bill,47 it might be
expected that its report would be careful to distinguish between a
law which covered all the private lands to be benefited and one
which covered only excess lands.
Even more important, the contemporary interpretation by the
43. Conceivably it could be argued that it is improper to place the burden on the
history of § 46 to demonstrate that it was an intentional departure from the 1924
and 1925 laws. Such an argument would suggest that the coverage of § 46, a law
of general application, should be compared with its predecessor general law, the 1914
Extension Act, and not with such special and limited laws as the San Carlos Act and
the Appropriation Act of 1925, or with the Fact Finders' proposal, which never became
law. It would be further argued that § 46 and the 1914 act are consistent, since both
deal only with excess lands and since the 1924 and 1925 laws were merely experiments which were tried and abandoned. This is possible, but it seems unlikely that
such important experiments-the result of years of open reconsideration of reclamation
policy-would be abandoned before they were given any chance to show their worth
and that there was utter silence about the rather important decision to abandon them
and return to the 1914 approach. Nor was silence customary for Congress when aban•
doning such experiments. The decision to discontinue state participation in breaking
up excess landholdings, accomplished in the very statutes we have been discussing, was
accompanied by extensive debate. The stark difference invites skepticism at the least,
44. (1925-1926] COMM'R OF RECLAMATION ANN. REP. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR
Z'J.
45. 43 Stat. 1168 (1925); 44 Stat. 479 (1926).
46. COMM'R OF RECLAMATION ANN, REP., op. cit. supra note 44, at 27.
47. See note 33 supra.
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Secretary of the Interior clearly supports the view that regulation
of incremental values was not meant to be limited merely to sales
of excess lands. Only five months after the passage of the 1926 Appropriation Act and the Omnibus Adjustment Act, the Secretary
entered into a repayment contract for the Owyhee Project.48 That
project was one of those expressly authorized in -the 1926 Appropriation Act, which contained an anti-speculation provision with language identical to section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act.49
The Secretary included in the contract an anti-speculation provision
requiring that when sales of project lands were made in excess 9f
appraised valuation, half of that incremental value must be paid to
the district as an advance on future construction, operation, and
maintenance charges.50 The significant fact is that this contractual
provision was not limited in its coverage merely to excess lands,
but expressly included non-excess lands. 51 While the Owyhee form
of contract was used extensively only in the Pacific Northwest, it
was by no means an eccentric or isolated instance. 52 At the least,
48. Contract betw·een the United States of America and the Owyhee Irrigation
District, October 14, 1926.
49. 44 Stat. 479 (1926).
50. Article 41 of the contract, supra note 48, provided inter alia:
(B) The amount in dollars by which the price fixed in any future sale of District
land exceeds the sum of (a) the appraised value of ,the land (as determined
by the appraisal provided for in subdivision C of this article); (b) the appraised value of the improvements thereon, if any (determined as provided
in subdivisions C and F of this article); (c) payments, if any, made ito the
United States on the construction charges upon such lands; and (d) twice ..
the amount of the payments, if any, made to the District under this article
upon any previous sale or sales of such land, shall for convenience of reference be termed the "incremented" value of said land.
(1) If any of the lands of the District are sold at an incremented value, as defined in subdivision B of this article, the vendor shall pay to the District,
or the vendee shall pay to the District out of the money which would otherwise have been payable to the vendor, an amount equal to fifty per centum
(50%) of such incremented value.
51. Article 4l(A) provided: "It is understood that this article does not apply to
any of the old lands of the project excepting the old excess lands, but does apply to all
new lands and excess lands." Definitions of old and new lands were provided in
Article 7:
Lands :having rights in canals now receiving their water supply by means of
pumping from Snake River, but which will secure their water supply from the
Owyhee Project after the same is constructed, and participate in the use of the
project canal system as well as the project reservoir, are herein referred to as the
"old" lands of the project. Lands which have no rights in the canals now receiving water by means of pumping from Snake River and which will secure
their entire water supply from the works of the Owyhee Project are herein referred to as the "new" lands of the project. • • .
,
52. The history of the Department's use of and attitude toward incremental
value contracts covering non-excess lands is most interesting. A survey recently made
of all repayment contracts for the period 1926-1954 shows the following: "Excluding
contracts which require the provision by reasons of specific legislation (Columbia
Basin, Tucumcari and WCU projects) [Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1119, as
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 590y-z (1964)], only 36 out of well over 1,000 contracts contain .the provision •••• Thirty-two out of ,the 36, moreover, involve Pacific North-

28

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 64:18

this indicates that the 1926 laws were not viewed as a bar to broad
control of incremental value sales. 53
The foregoing analysis is not designed to suggest that section
46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act requires the use of incremental value provisions for non-excess lands. It is designed to show,
however, that section 46 neither forbids the use of such provisions
nor in any sense necessarily embodies a congressional desire
that incremental value controls be imposed only on the disposition
of excess lands. Probably the most that can be said is that Congress
was groping-not unwilling to accept broad controls when they
· were included in legislative drafts and not sufficiently concerned
to make sure that the broad coverage did not slip out of the laws.
The conclusions intended at this point are merely: (1) that broad
price control of non-excess land sales has been at least acceptable
to Congress and to the officials entrusted with the administration
of the reclamation laws; (2) that Congress did not, in 1926, reject
the use of such controls; and (3) that therefore whether such controls ought to be employed is a question that turns on congressional
intent since 1926, to the extent that it is relevant, and upon an
inquiry into what incremental value policy would best advance the
goals of the reclamation program. Before embarking upon an analysis of the policy question, we must pause briefly to examine the
legislative history since 1926.
west projects •••." Letter from Edward Weinberg, Deputy Solicitor, Dept. of the
Interior to author, June 1965. By contrast, reports and testimony of Department of•
ficials usually give the impression that such contracts were quite widely used. Sec,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 448, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1949); Hearings on S. 2172 Before
the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation To Prevent Speculation in Lands
in the Columbia Basin, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1937); Memorandum From the
Commissioner of Reclamation to J. A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior Gune 16, 1948)
(copy in the author's possession). "In any event, from 1954, if not earlier, it lias not
been departmental policy ·to include in contracts sale price controls on non-excess
lands." Letter from Edward Weinberg to author, March 29, 1965.
53. The validity of the Owyhee contract was challenged on ,the ground that the
Secretary had no authority to control non-excess land sales. Terra v. Pinney & Owyhee
Irrigation Dist., No. 4829E, Cir. Ct., Malheur County, Ore., Jan. 27, 1937 (decision reprinted in 27 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE RECLAMATION ERA 128 (1937)), The
court sustained the validity of the contract, but the opinion is so unsatisfactory that
neither the precise ground of the objection nor the basis for sustaining the Secretary's
authority is clear. It has been suggested that the cases turned on the broad authority
given to the Secretary in § 10 of the 1902 act (see note 41 supra; sec also 3
PRESIDENT'S WATER R.EsOURCES POLICY COMM'N, WATER R.EsOURCES LAW 232 (1950)),
but that conclusion is not at all clear from the Oregon court's opinion, Such an
interpretation of the opinion would seem to be supported by the fact that the incremental value provision was to be in effect for the whole term of the repayment obligation (Contract, supra note 48, art. 4l[L]) and not merely until half the costs were
repaid.
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E. Legislative Developments After 1926'
Congress enacted no anti-speculation legislation for more than
a decade after the passage of the 1926 laws. Then, in 1937, it passed
a special law for the Columbia Basin Project. 54 While this statute
was limited in its application solely to that project and has since
been repealed, 65 its background is worth examining, for it is illustrative of congressional una,vareness of the specific problem at
issue here.
The 1937 Columbia Basin law was phrased more expansively
than any anti-speculation law Congress had ever previously -considered. It expressly required the restriction of incremental value
sales on "all irrigable lands whether initially excess or non-excess," 56
and it imposed that requirement until the repayment obligation had
been entirely liquidated.67 The purpose of this restriction, however,
was not to grant the incremental value subsidy to the buying settler
in preference to the selling settler. There was no recognition whatever of the issue with which we are concerned-choosing how the
benefit should be distributed as between the competing interests
of the settlers.
The sole purpose of the restriction, according to its draftsman,
was to secure the government's repayment rights by preventing
the possibility of a ruinous speculation "during the period that we
still have a financial interest in this project." 58 Thus, here as in
earlier times, the only issue that was seen to be raised by incremental value sales was that of jeopardizing the security of the repayment obligation. Again it was assumed that if repayment were
secure, it would obviously be proper to remove all restrictions on
incremental sales and to give the benefit of increased land values
to the settler. There is no evidence that it was ever called to the
attention of Congress that there are two competing classes of bona
fide settlers-the selling settlers and the buying settlers-and that
a legitimate issue existed as to which of them should be preferred
in distributing the benefit of incremental values, regardless of the
54. 50 Stat. 208 (1937).
55. The anti-speculation provision of the 1937 act was superseded by 57 Stat. 14
(1943), the relevant provisions of which were repealed by 76 Stat. 678 (1962). See also
52 Stat. 211 (1938), repealed 6~ Stat. 556 (1955); 54 Stat. 1121 (1940), 16 U.S.C. § 590z2(c)(5) (1964).
56. 50 Stat. 209. (1937).
57. The act did not expressly so provide, but that intent was made quite explicit
by the bill's draftsman, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. Hearings on
s. 2172 Before the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation To Prevent
speculation in Lands in the Columbia Basin, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 31 (1937).
58. Hearings on S. 2172, supra note 57, at 29.

30

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:15

status of repayment. All through the years, Congress automatically
equated "settler" with "selling settler."
For this reason, it appears that when it was possible to persuade
Congress that the people on the project would be able to meet their
repayment obligations, Congress was ready to remove all restrictions on incremental value sales. That is precisely what has been
done. Beginning in the 1940's, as repayment stabilized the Depart•
ment of the Interior took the position that incremental value restrictions were no longer necessary. Perhaps the first step in this
last phase of the history was the amendment of the Columbia Basin
Act in 1943, reducing the period of restriction to only five years. 00
This was done on the theory that ruinous speculation occurred
only during the first years of a project's existence; after that time,
as true settlers got on the land and put it into profitable production, repayment was being made and the need for control was
thought to be at an end. 60
This theory was made explicit in 1949 when the Department of
the Interior sought to limit the use of incremental value controls
throughout reclamation administration to periods not exceeding
five years. 61 Its position was that:
The intent of the incremental value provision was to extend
speculation control to nonexcess holdings and thereby, during
the settlement and development periods, to stabilize land prices
and prevent the over-capitalization of the lands by a failure to
recognize the burden of unpaid construction costs, thus protecting the investment of the settler and assuring the repayment
of construction costs in accordance with the contract.
In operation, it has become apparent that after a project has
been developed and settled and the District has levied and collected assessments to cover construction installments for a period of years a need for control of speculation in nonexcess
lands is materially lessened. 62
Thus, the legislative history subsequent to 1926, while relevant, is
in no sense determinative of the problem with which this article
is concerned.
59. 57 Stat. 14 (1943).
60. 89 CONG. R..Ec. 1252-53 (1943); Hearings on H.R. 6522 (Part 2) and H.R, 7722
Before the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation To Amend the Columbia
Basin Project Act, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1942).
61. H.R. REP. No. 448, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1949); Memorandum from the
Commissioner of Reclamation to the Secretary of the Interior, June 16, 1948, approved,
June 29, 1948 (copy in the author's possession).
62. Memorandum, supra note 61, at 2.
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MISCONCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM

It should by now be clear that control of incremental value
sales has always been viewed as a problem of control of speculation,
and the existence of speculation has been measured by the ability
of settlers to survive financially and to meet their repayment obligations. Thus, in a loose sort of way the policy seems to have been
that when control of incremental value sales on non-excess lands
was necessary to secure the repayment obligation, they were employed; and when such controls were not needed for that purpose,
they were abandoned.
For this reason the issues upon which incremental value control
policy has been determined through the years are quite unrelated to
the question with which we are here concerned. That questionupon which group of ·bona fide settlers the value is to be conferred
as a reclamation benefit-is a totally separate issue. The mere fact
that the repayment debt is current does not suggest that the selling
settler is to be preferred over the buying settler or over the irrigation district as a trustee for all those on the project. Indeed, as we
shall see, every element of a rational reclamation policy suggests that of all the available alternatives, that which gives the profit
to the seller is the one wholly unacceptable solution.

A.

The Source of the Confusion

In the early days of reclamation, permitting incremental profits
to be taken was disastrous to recoupment of the repayment obligation, and therefore such profits were generally forbidden. Later,
for a variety of reasons, it became possible for the United States to
permit the taking of incremental profits (that is, to. grant that additional value as a subsidy) and also to recoup its contracted-for repayment.68 The result was a repeal of the restrictions on .incre63. Though not essential to the analysis here, there is a revealing sidelight on
congressional incremental value policy which deserves comment. As we have seen, all
through the years the congressional attitude toward incremental value sales was
.guided by the status of repayment. It was the original policy that the full costs of
construction would be repaid by water users in a relatively short time. Theoretically,
at least, reclamation policy has retained the principle of full recoupment of costs.
However, the repayment obligation has been in fact greatly diminished under modem
reclamation law. See note 4 supra.
In this context, it is instructive to note that the movement to reduce, and then to
eliminate, restrictions on incremental value sales began in the 1940's, shortly after the
passage of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1187, 43 U.S.C. § 485 (1958).
It was the Project Act which largely introduced the modern law of repayment with
its greatly reduced obligations for irrigation users. Thus, while Interior Department
officials and Congress urged the dropping of restrictions on incremental value sales
on the ground ,that speculation was no longer a problem, what that view may really
have meant was that speculation was no longer a problem because the repayment
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mental profits. The trouble was that this repeal not only had the
effect of allowing the incremental value-which was perfectly consistent with reclamation policy-but also had the unconscious
effect of permitting the selling settler to reap the value rather than
retaining it for successors on the project., This came about because
Congress apparently never considered that i11; distributing the benefit of the incremental value, it would have to choose between competing classes of bona fide settlers. It is this problem which Congress
has never faced, 64 and which, as proposed here, should now be
confronted directly for the first time. The following pages are devoted to an examination' of that problem of choice.
B. Some Alternative Choices

I. The Pioneer Theory: An Anachronism
The first-generation settlers on any project have generally
been able to acquire their land at pre-project values and then to
obligation :had been minimized so that it no longer created financial difficulties for
the purchasers of project water rights at incremented values. The problem of the
double obligation was defeated, perhaps, not by an end of speculation (selling at
· prices which included the market value of the water right), but by the reduction of
repayment as a major economic obligation.
If this is what actually happened, then the removal of incremental value restric•
tions has helped to undermine, sub silentio, a key reclamation policy: the policy that
substantial repayment of construction costs was to be assured before any incremental
profits were to be allowed to any settler, whether seller or buyer. The policy has been
undermined because the irrigators' repayment obligations have been greatly reduced
on the ground that they are paying all they can afford, whereas we know they can
afford to pay, and do pay, incremental values for project water rights. If congressional
policy continues to hold that assuring substantial repayment is more important than
permitting the reaping of incremental values, then the present system-whereby such
profits arc allowed, but repayment is subsidized by power revenues or the general
public-seems inconsistent with that policy. Would it not be more consistent with
this policy to recapture incremental profits and use them ,to reduce the subsidy pro•
vided by the other two sources?
64. A principal purpose of the preceding discussion has been to show that there
is no binding statutory intent which must determine ,the administrative or judicial
attitude toward incremental values. Certainly it should be clear that the Omnibus
Adjustment Act does not prohibit recapture of incremental values in non-excess land
sales. Moreover, each of the recent e.xpress efforts to eliminate control of incremental
value sales has been placed on a different ground, none of which indicates how Con•
gress would react to the inter-settler problem posed here and none of which prohibits
a change of policy to meet that proplem. Thus, the position taken by the Department
of the Interior in the late 1940's turned on the assumption that ability to meet re·
payment obligations was the critical issue, see te.xt accompanying note 62 supra; re•
peal of the Arch-Hurley law was largely guided by problems of practical administra•
tion, sec te.xt accompanying note 87 infra; suggested elimination of the Wellton-Mohawk
provision was based on difficulties encountered by settlers in obtaining financing, sec
te.xt accompanying note 69 infra; and the Columbia Basin provision repeal was sought
on the ground that the project ought to be brought into conformity with other
projects. Hearings on S. 3162 Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation
of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 2d Scss. 5 (1962),
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sell out at full market value. Is there any reason to let these earlier
settlers reap this capital profit when they sell and carry it off the
project to the detriment of successor settlers?
The first response of those who defend the practice might be
to show that this is the tradition of such programs. When the United States disposed of the public domain, as under the Homestead
or Desert Land Acts, it was the first taker who was in a position to
reap the benefit by acquiring land for virtually nothing and selling it for full market value. Not only is this traditional, the argument goes, but the problem is an inevitable one; someone must
take the benefit at some point. Thus, the question might be reversed: why prefer the second or third settler to the first? In fact, it
may be urged, there is a quite good reason for preferring the first
settler. He is the one who had the courage to go on unsettled and
untried land and to bring it into cultivation. In that sense he is
being used as an instrumentality for promoting a national policy
of land settlement, and the incremental value is a reward for that
service which only the first settler performs.65
The notion that the first settler should be rewarded for his
efforts as a pioneer was undoubtedly a factor in disposing of the
public domain, and it may have been consistent with early reclamation policy when Jand settlement was a principal goal and the
original farmer really was a pioneer. However, it appears most
ironically inappropriate today when reclamation policy and practice have taken an almost opposite direction. In order to get a
typical reclamation project approved today, its proponents must
demonstrate that the government investment will not open new
lands to cultivation and thereby intensify existing agricultural sur- ·
phises. 00 The keynote of reclamation today is not land settlement,
but land rescue. An advocate for a new project will argue that what
is needed is a supplemental water supply to help existing farmers
stabilize their existing operations.
Under these circumstances, the first beneficiary of the project
appears in quite a different light. In the traditional case, benefit
65. This history is discussed. in HIBBARD, A HlsroRY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES
(1939). The land may also have been a reward for services rendered, or to be rendered,
in the military service. Id. at 116-35.
66. It should be clear that modern reclamation policy is anything but a land set•
tlement policy and that its beneficiaries are not the hardy pioneers of yore. See, e.g.,
70 Stat. 1059 (1956), 43 U.S.C. § 615K (1964); S. REP. No. 83, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8
(1961); 108 CONG. REc. 15669 (1962); 106 id. 18762, 15427 (1960); 103 id. 4749 (1957);
102 id. 11940 (1956). Of course some new lands are brought into cultivation by new
projects, but they are typically merely unused portions of well-settled areas. See, e.g.,
H.R. Doc. No. 444, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1960) (Mann Creek Project, Idaho). The
Columbia Basin Project was probably the last great undertaking that really represented
a policy of settling new lands.
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worked both ways. The government wanted the land settled, and
the pioneer fulfilled that desire~ for which he was duly rewarded.
However, times have changed dramatically, and under today's circumstances it seems rather inappropriate to suggest that the original
settler is entitled to the benefit of incremental land values on the
ground that he was the one who put in "the thought, the hard
work and the effort to make a going farm out of raw land." 67 Far
from being an agent who implements government policy by going
on the public land and civilizing it-and who deserves a reward
for his courage and hard work-the typical modem "first settler"
resembles much more closely the welfare recipient, for he is already
in business, needs help to preserve the business, and seeks that help
from the United States.

2. The Indifference Theory: Another Fallacy
A second argument that might be advanced in favor of permitting incremental profits is that if the United States is going to distribute the water-right value as part of its subsidy, the benefit is going to have to come to rest on some person at some point. That is,
some settler is eventually going to reap the benefit, so it might as
well be the first as the second or the fourth or the tenth. However,
ihis way of putting the question wholly misstates the choice. It is not
a question of whether settler number one or settler number two will
take the capital profit. The real question is whether this value will
be retained on the project for whoever happen to be the inhabitants
at the time or whether it will be converted into cash and possibly be
carried off the project to be used for purposes which are of no interest or advantage to the reclamation program.
If we say that the value belongs always to the persons coming
on the project and stays with them only so long as they are project
inhabitants, passing to the next generation and the next, then the
benefit never comes to rest on any given person; it stays with the
project as a project value. This approach is hardly a novel one,
however foreign it may be to current reclamation administration.
It merely embodies the principle that a government grant ought to
be dispensed solely to achieve the purpose for which the money was
appropriated and not to provide some unrelated windfall. For example, a public welfare program is designed to aid needy people
while -they are needy, and no longer; when one ceases to need welfare, he cannot sell the right to receive monthly payments to an67. Hearings on H.R. 6522 the Columbia Basin Project Act Before the House
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1942).
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other. It is the status of an individual, and not his personal identity,
that determines the entitlement. Free textbooks are given to students qua students; when they leave school, they must leave the
books for their successors. The White House belongs to the current
occupant of the Presidency. T!J.e application of this principle to
reclamation should be obvious. The money Congress appropriates
for reclamation is meant to be used to promote that program. The
choice we are faced with is this: should that money, in the form of
the water-right value, be retained in the project for present reclamation project inhabitants, or should we permit it to be converted
into cash which the seller, who is withdrawing from the project,
may use for purposes wholly unrelated to the goals of the reclamation program? Is it not clear that the seller should relinquish his
subsidy when he relinquishes his status on the project?68
3. Use of Incremental Values as Loan Collateral:
A Meritorious Argument and an Alternative Solution

The only creditable argument which may be offered in support
of current practice is based on the claim that a settler must "own"
-the capital value of the water right to obtain necesary bank loans.
The point has been made that banks are reluctant to loan money
on lands encumbered with incremental value contracts.69 From this
it has been concluded that if settlers are to be enabled to make the
necessary borrowings, they must be free from incremental value restrictions, although this would, of course, also leave them free to
sell the water right to a successor. This problem need in no way
68. Undoubtedly this theory has implications beyond the reclamation laws.
Wherever public funds are being spent, or public property being utilized, there is a
question whether the expenditure is being used to advance the purpose for which it
was made. See, e.g., Comment, Public Land Laws-Need for Revision, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 473, 496-97 (1964) (treatment of Taylor Grazing Act permits by the permittees as
salable private property). Perhaps it is fair to characterize this article as an aspect of
the broader struggle between the limited-grant concept and the windfall concept in
the management of public resources. The dominance of the former approach today
is illustrated by the changes which have taken place in federal mining law, where the
old fee simple patent approach has in part yielded to leasing and multiple development concepts. Compare REv. STAT. § 2325 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), with 41 Stat.
437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1964), and 68 Stat. 708 (1954), 30 U.S.C. §§ 521-26 (1964).
Another aspect of this general problem is discussed in Mandelker, Controlling Land
Values in Areas of Rapid Urban Expansion, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 734 (1965).
69. Congress was told that ,this problem had created a serious impediment to settlers who were subject to incremental value contracts on the Wellton-Mohawk Division of the Gila Project in Arizona. In consequence, the Senate and House Appropriations Committees both recommended that the Secretary "carefully review those
contracts in which such a provision exists, to eliminate it, and, if necessary, substitute some reasonable measure for controlling speculation." H.R. REP. No. 1460,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1954); S. REP. No. 1506, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954); Hearings
on H.R. 8680 Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
1239-43 (1954).
-
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impair the position being advanced here. What is desired is that
project settlers have the use of the value of the water right as collateral for improvement loans. This is a most admirable and sensible objective; as presently implemented, however, it fails to take
account of the fact that there will be turnover on the projects.
Once we introduce the fact of mobility into this problem, we see
that the grant of the water right as collateral inures largely to the
benefit of the first settler. When he sells out at full market price,
he takes that economic value with him off the project, and the reclamation purpose which was served in giving him the value-the
ability to borrow to improve project property-goes with him.
Thus, we are back to the problem: why should the benefit be
given only to the first generation settler?
To be consistent with a rational reclamation policy, we would
want to distribute the benefit of increased ability to borrow equally
to every settler. In order properly to implement such a subsidy, the
benefit should be available only while one is a settler and only
for project purposes. There is, it seems, a simple and well-known
way of achieving this purpose. The United States can guarantee
loans made to project settlers for project purposes; the guarantee
can provide the desired collateral without producing the improper
side effects which now exist.
C. The Most Equitable Solution: Retention of the
Incremental Values in the Project
The view suggested here-that attention should be focused on
the project rather than on any individual settler-is corroborated
by some other elements in the reclamation laws. For example, the
old 1914 anti-speculation law70 was expressly designed to prevent
profiteers from taking money out of the project to the detriment
of the remaining settlers. Similarly, the law permitting outside sales
of project water expressly requires that no such sales may be made
unless in-project needs have first been met. 71 From this perspective,
the selling settler (assuming, as we have indicated, that he is entitled to no reward as a pioneer for past services rendered) is essentially in the same situation as the pure speculator; he embodies the
threat that the federal subsidy ·will be drained out of the project
for uses which may not serve federal reclamation policy at all.
This same conclusion can be dra·wn from another perspective.
The idea that project settlers are entitled to reap incremental land
70. 38 Stat, 686 (1914).
71. 41 Stat. 451 (1920), 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1964); 36 Stat. 925 (1911), 43 U.S.C, § 523
(1964).
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values as profits is attributable, at least in some degree, to the notion that under the repayment system the United States is selling,
and the settlers are buying, the irrigation system.72 A buyer is, of
course, entitled to the value of what he has bought. Nevertheless,
even assuming that the characterization of the transaction as a sale
is more or less accurate,73 the real question is: who is the buyer?
Under current practice, we are proceeding as if the individual
water user is the buyer of that share of project water which he has
used on his land. This is a most inaccurate assumption, however.
Today the actual "buyer" is the irrigation or conservancy district,
the agency which in fact has assumed the repayment obligation.74
The district differs from the individual water users in several
important ways. Although the individual water users as a_ group
comprise the district and are thus coextensive with it, the extent
of each user's right to share in district assets is not properly measured by the proportion of project water he uses, but rather by the
proportion of the repayment obligation which he bears. These two
£actors are frequently not the same. For example, a user of one per
cent of the project water may very well not be paying one per cent of
the repaym~nt contract, but under current administration he will
reap one per cent of the incremental profits. The reasons for the disparity between the share of water used and the share of repayment
obligation borne are manifold. On many projects the construction
cost obligation is calculated on the basis of acreage, not water use.
Thus, those who grow thirsty crops and use much more water will
pay as little as others with similar acreage, but much less water use. 75
Also, some projects charge construction costs to lands which are not
in irrigation and are using no water.76 Another principal reason for
the diversity in costs arises from the classification of water uses
72. One of the most recent examples of the attempt to characterize the relationship as a standard commercial transaction is found in Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v.
California, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 628-29, 306 P.2d 824, 843-44 (1957), rev'd sub nom. Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 289, 299 (1958).
_
73. As previously indicated, note 4 suprn, and as the Supreme Court has made
eminently clear, the extent of the subsidy involved makes the comparison of the
transaction to a sale accurate only in the most attenuated and superficial sense. See
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, supra note 72, at 299.
74. Even the California court took the position in Ivanhoe that at the end of the
repayment period it is the District which will "become the owner in trust for the
water users within the District." 47 Cal. 2d at 630, 306 P .2d at 843. Although the
California court was talking about ownership of the distribution works, it should be
clear that as an economic matter the value of the works is reflected in the market
price of the right to receive project water.
75. E.g., Carlsbad Irrigation District, New Mexico; Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
Idaho; Salt River Project, Arizona (letters to the author from district managers, Feb.
1965).
76. Roza Irrigation District, Washington (letter to author from district manager,
Feb. 8, 1965).
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based on land productivity.77 Similarly, municipal and industrial
users may pay a much higher rate than agricultural users.18 In
one district, agricultural users consume 85 per cent of the water but
bear only 40.5 per cent of repayment burden. 10 Another district
charges each user a fixed dollar fee toward meeting the annual
repayment obligation, regardless of the amount of water used.80
In addition, the district may earn income from such activity as
the selling of tmm sites or the leasing of grazing and farm lands.
Under the reclamation law, profits from such sources are to be
credited to repayment of project construction charges. 81 Finally,
to the extent that the actual repayment costs are underwritten by
power revenues, 82 there is a great disparity between the amount of
water used and the share of construction costs borne.83 All of these
instances are cited merely to show that it may make a considerable
difference whether incremental values are turned over to the district as an entity or to the individual user.
Moreover, giving the values to the district would have another
effect even more important than that of changing the distributive
profile. Giving the values to the.district does not merely mean that
they will be received by the constituents thereof, because the district
undoubtedly will not, at least prior to the time repayment is completed, make a cash distribution to the persons on the project. 84
The district holds the money it receives in trust for the fulfillment
of its primary obligations-operation of the project and repayment
to the United States. If it received the incremental values, it might
do one of several things. It could apply those values on the debt to
the United States in order to reduce the taxes of the project's constituents, 85 or it could expend the money on project improvements.
77. E.g., Kittitas Reclamation District, Washington; Owl Creek Irrigation District,
Wyoming; Gering-Fort Laramie Irrigation District, Nebraska (letters to author from
district managers, Feb. 1965).
78. E.g., Ventura River Municipal Water District, California; Solano Irrigation
District, California; Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District, Arizona (let•
ters to author from district managers, Feb. and April 1965).
79. Eastern Municipal Water District, California (letter to author from district
manager, March 2, 1965).
80. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District, Idaho (letter to author from district
manager, Feb. 8, 1965).
81. 43 Stat. 703 (1924), 43 U.S.C. § 501 (1964).
82. See note 4 supra.
83. Letter ,to author from general manager of the Imperial Irrigation District,
California, Feb. 15, 1965.
84. The congressional attitude toward such distributions seems to be indicated
in 43 Stat. 703 (1924), 43 U.S.C. § 501. (1964).
85. The manner in which such monies might be applied in liquidation of the re•
payment obligation can vary considerably. Using the money to meet current obliga•
tions, and there.by reduce current taxes, would be most favorable to the settlers and
least favorable to the United States. If the monies were used first to pay off the laat
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In either of these ways the values would be used in the manner discussed in the foregoing subsection; they would be retained in the
project for the accomplishment of project aims and ends. Such a
result would seem to be far more consistent with reclamation policy
than is the present administration, which permits the use of a public
subsidy to enrich individuals who are free to apply the money received to non-project purposes.
From the foregoing discussion, it seems fair to conclude that prohibiting incremental value sales is consistent with true congressional
policy, not because settlers should be denied this benefit, but rather
because such sales give the values to the wrong settlers. It is the
failure to see the issue in this light that has made the legislative
history seem such a tangled mess.
The legal conclusion to which we have now come is indeed a
simple one. It is that the money for which a reclamation-project
water right is sold or leased (whether by itself or along with the land
irrigated) does not belong to the sell~r, but should be recovered by
tlie irrigation or conservancy district-the repayment obligor-to be
held in trust and used for the benefit of the present project community.86
·
It must be emphasized that the proposal made here is not merely
an indirect scheme for arguing that reclamation water prices are set
too low. This article accepts the fact that Congress desires to subsidize reclamation; it <;mly suggests that the existing subsidy should be
redistributed. It is of course true that if repayment obligations are
adjusted upward, approaching market costs, the opportunity for
dollar of debt due (i.e., a dollar not due for fifty years, which dollar is on loan interest
free) in advance, the scheme would be vastly ,more favorable to the United States. See
note 63 supra; see also 52 Stat. 211 (1938); 50 Stat. 208 (1937). A third alternative would
be to use recovered incremental values to pay off irrigation costs allocated to power
revenues, thus reducing the subsidy which irrigators receive. This approa~, of course,
would not benefit the project settlers, but rather the power users or the general public.
Any of these alternatives would be acceptable under the theory of this article, and each
would be far more consistent with a rational reclamation policy than is the present
system.
The district, under this proposal, should be entitled to receive incremental values
permanently. The time limitation in the 1926 act, formulated for a different purpose,
should not bar a new result based on newly discovered issues. Cf. 68 I.D. 372 (1961)
(Op. Sol., Dept. Int. No. M-36634).
.
86. When incremental value sales have been restricted in the past, it has been
customary for the district to recapture only some fraction of the incremental value,
usually 50%, and to permit the seller to keep the balance for himself. E.g., ArchHurley Project, 52 Stat. 211 (1938); Owyhee Contract, supra note 50, art. 41(1). Sometimes a more complex sliding scale has been employed, requiring the seller to repay
between 50% and 99% of the incremented value. Columbia Basin Project, 50 Stat. 208
(1937). Such devices, obviously designed to promote alienability by giving the landowner some incentive -to sell, are unobjectionable. Hearings on S. 2172 Before the
Senate Committee ·on Irrigation and Reclamation, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1937).
Other adjustments that would have to be made are discussed in note 88 infra.
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profit-taking would be destroyed and the problem at issue here
would automatically be solved. It is also true that a problem of how
to house condemned prisoners would be terminated by abolishing
capital punishment, but one who proposes a solution to the housing
problem should not be viewed as advocating, or even as implicitly
passing judgment upon, the abolition of capital punishment. The
two issues are quite separable. There seems little reason to believe
that the subsidy will be withdrawn imminently; while it remains,
the important, independent problem of distribution ought to be
solved. It remains now only to suggest how the solution proposed
can practicably be implemented. .
V.

PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATION

The practical problems of administering the proposal suggested
here are essentially of three kinds. First, to what extent are existing contracts and existing state laws a bar to modification of present
practices? Second, to what extent does longstanding administrative
practice bar a change in that practice, absent express congressional
authorization? Third, can the redistribution of values be achieved
without invoking some terribly complex and expensive administrative machinery to determine what monies are being misapplied?
The third problem is the most troublesome, and it may be helpful
to dispose of it first.

A. Complex Administrative Machinery Is Unnecessary
Previous attempts to regulate incremental value sales have had
little success in finding an easy means for determining that portion
of a sale price which is to be designated as a windfall.87 The difficulty arises in part because most transactions are sales of farms at
a gross price which includes, without specific allocation, the value
of the land, improvements, and ·water. The problem is, therefore,
the isolation and recoupment of that amo1:1nt which represents the
actual value of the water right. 88
87. E.g., S. REP. No. 1156, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (repealing the incremental
value requirement in the Arch-Hurley Law).
88. The district would not recover the full market value of the water right. The
seller would be given credit for any increment he had paid his vendor. He might also
be given credit for amounts he had already contributed toward the repayment obligation. This has apparently been the practice in incremental value contracts. LAND•
OWNERSHIP SURVEY 48. See also note 86 supra, suggesting another adjustment that
might be necessary.
Theoretically, it would be simpler to prevent water rights from being sold at all
and to hold instead that the rights pass automatically and without charge to successor landowners. However, ·there seems to be no practical way of assuring that water
would not be sold anyway in the form of increased land prices.

~
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The methods thus far utilized to isolate that value have been
quite complex. The traditional approach required an appraisal of
the land, the individual improvements on each farm, the construction charges paid, and "other items of value that are proper." 89
Since improvements were continuously being made, any attempt to
be accurate in allocation of values involved frequent reappraisals.90
When all these values were ascertained, their sum was viewed as
representing the total value of the property without reference to
the project. Any excess over this amount was considered an incremental value which the United States was entitled to recover.
In addition to complexity, this approach obviously involved another serious flaw. By treating the entire excess over appraised value
as an increment attributable solely to the existence of the project,
this method failed to recognize that other factors-such as. general
inflation or proximity to budding urban development-also affect
land prices.91 Disillusionment with such misleading rigidities and
with the above complexities has undoubtedly enhanced congressional
sympathy for requests to repeal existing incremental value laws.
The question here is whether any attempt to recover incremental
values is necessarily doomed to similar administrative difficulties.
Prior attempts have bogged down, in part, because they sought to
deduce the value of the water right from a mass ·of other data in an
elimination process. It might, however, be possible to approach the
issue directly, that is, by finding the independent market value of
the irrigation water. If we can discover this, then for any sale we
need only find the amount of water involved in the transfer (which
is easy and obvious, since it is the amount the project is delivering
to the land or individual in question), multiply it by the market
value per acre foot of water, and hold that that sum92 is owed to the
project by the vendor. The specific consideration is thus whether
project water has an ascertainable market value.
Certainly in many irrigation areas it is not customary to think
in terms of the value of water rights as such. If inquiry were to be
made concerning the unit value of project water, a common answer
might be that "it is the value of the land, and not the acre foot of
water •.. that is the yardstick." 93 But the mere custom that water
89. E.g., 57 Stat. 14 (1943) (Columbia Basin Project).
90. Ibid.
91. S. REP, No. 1156, supra note 87.
92. Properly adjusted, as explained in notes 86 and 88 supra.
93. Letter to the author from the general manager of the Salt River Project,
Arizona, Feb. 24, 1965. Farmers frequently use irrigated land as the measure of value
and do not attach any price to water rights alone. Letters to the author from Terra
Bella Irrigation District, California, Feb. 15, 1965, and Vale-Oregon Irrigation District, Oregon, Feb. 1965.
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right values, as such, are not generally used does not mean that they
cannot be ascertained. The following comments are designed to suggest that such values may not be nearly so elusive as past experience
· seems to indicate.
On many projects, users are allowed to sell or lease their water
rights for a valuable consideration. While permanent sales seem to
be relatively uncommon at the present time, 94 temporary leasing
of water on an annual basis appears to be quite widespread.90 One
of the truisms of the marketplace is that the capital value of property can easily be ascertained from its annual rental value. Thus, in
any project where selling or leasing is at all common, calculation of
the market value of water rights per acre foot should be rather
easy.96 This value can, of course, be applied to determine the value
of the water right in the sale of a farm for an undifferentiated total
price.
In addition, a good deal of market information is ordinarily
94. As previously noted, sales are permitted on the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the following arc a
few examples of projects where permanent transfers of water rights arc permitted:
American Falls Reservoir District, Idaho (letter to author from manager, Feb. 1965);
Carlsbad Irrigation District, New Mexico (letter to author from manager, Feb. 20,
1965); Collbran Conservancy District, Colorado (Rules and Regulations for Realloca•
tion and Transfer of Water Allotments 9, Dec. 7, 1961); Fremont-Madison Irrigation
District, Idaho (letter to author from manager, Feb. 1965); Provo River Water Users
Association, Utah (letter ,to author from manager, Feb. 15, 1965); Strawberry Water
Users Association, Utah (letter to author from manager, Feb. 11, 1965); Washoe
County Water Conservation District, Nevada (letter to author from manager, Feb.
1965).
The Fremont-Madison District reported that it had only one permanent sale in
1964; the American Falls Reservoir District reported three; and the Strawberry District
reported that transfers are "quite infrequent."
95. The Carlsbad Irrigation District, New Mexico, reports that "because we arc
chronically short of water to supply the water rights of the District we have many
transfers•••• We estimate that approximately 3,200 acre feet of water was transferred
during 1965." Letter to author from manager, Feb. 20, 1965.
The Boise Project Board of Control, which operates five irrigation districts, re•
ports that "at times the transfer of allotted water reaches fair proportions • • • • Dur•
ing the season of 1961, which was one of short supply, a good many of the summer's
allotments changed hands for as much as $8.00 an acre foot." Letter to author from
manager, March 1, 1965.
In addition -to those cited above and in note 94 supra, a number of districts reported
that they permitted annual leasing, without indicating how frequent or widespread
such leasing is. E.g., Form Authorizing Transfer of Water From One Parcel of Land
to Another Parcel of Land Under Different Ownerships, Lindmore Irrigation District,
California (Rules and Regulations Adopted Jan. 8, 1963); letter to author from superin•
tendent of the Mirage Flats Irrigation District, Nebraska, Feb. 26, 1965; letter to author
from manager of Reeves County Water Improvement District No. I, Texas, Feb. 23,
1965; letter to author from manager of the Stone Corral Irrigation District, California,
March 15, 1965.
96. To be sure, former sales or leases are not a flawless indicator of current value.
Prices paid may reflect, for example, a itime of especially intense shortage or a trans•
action not at arms' length; furthermore, what one farmer paid another may not
represent what a farmer could get from a city. Nevertheless, such market imperfections
pervade every appraisal process.
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available from related transactions in the general community. For
example, the average differential between the cost of irrigated and
non-irrigated land is a significant guide to the value of a water right.111
Moreover, local sales of ditch company stock and ground water
rights, condemnations, municipal water rates, and the like, all are
important indicators of water right values.98 To be sure, there are
individual differences and market imperfections which make any
such process of evaluation speculative and approximate. Nevertheless, there is considerable experience in the evaluation of water
rights which suggests that no insuperable barriers need be anticipated. It is quite common, for example, to have to find the value
of water rights in order to ascertain the base upon which water
company rates are to be calculated.99 Such an evaluation must also
be made whenever a municipality condemns water rights to supply
its residents. 100 Moreover, the courts are already familiar with the
problem of determining the difference in land values with and
without water rights.101 Of course, determination of market values
"is largely a matter of opinion,"102 and this would be particularly
true in areas where there is an inactive market in water rights.
However, this difficulty has been met in water right appraisal proceedings in the same manner as it has in other areas.103
97. The manager of the Klamath Basin Improvement District reported that when
land gets a water right, its value jumps "from around $50.00 per acre to between
$200.00 and $250.00 per acre • • • ." Letter to author from the secretary-treasurer,
March 30, 1965. Similarly, a report from the Tulelake Irrigation District notes that
"land with a water right is worth twice as much as land without a water right." Letter
to author from the manager, Feb. 17, 1965.
98. Such data are available even in states with appurtenance rules which seem to
prohibit any transactions in water rights alone. This is made clear by a leading authority in the field. Dean Trelease, in Severance of Water Rights From Wyoming
Lands 2 ((1960) WYOMING LEGISLATIVE REsEAitCH COMM,, REP. No. 2), notes that there
are ten kinds of transactions allowed in Wyoming which permit the transfer of water
without appurtenant land. He concludes that "the exceptions already made have almost swallowed the rule." Id. at 36. He has also concluded, however, that despite the
exceptions, the market for water rights alone in Wyoming is an exceedingly limited
one. Letter to author, April 9, 1965.
·
99. E.g., McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); San Joaquin &:
King's River Canal&: Irrigation Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454 (1914); Reno
Power, Light &: Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 Fed. 645 (D. Nev. 1921); Osborn
Util. Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 52 Idaho 571, 17 P.2d 333 (1932).
100. E.g., Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P .2d 975 (1951); Village
of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397, 207 P.2d 1025 (1949); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111
Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947); Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
101, E.g., United States v. Twin City. Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 237 n.9 (1956)
(condemnation); Shurbet v. United States, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965) (cost depletion of
ground water).
102. Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 353 (1890).
103. "It should be measured by the fair market value of a similar water right in
the locality, or a similar locality, if such can be established by satisfactory evidence.
If no market value can be established, then the opinion of competent witnesses as
to the actual value may be considered. In this respect the case does not .present any
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To be sure, valuation of property is often quite unsatisfactory.
Whether reclamation water rights can be satisfactorily evaluated is
simply unknown at the present time. There is at least some reason
to believe that market prices are reasonably ascertainable. Congress
ought to be willing to try the experiment; much might be gained,
and there is nothing more to lose.

B. State Laws and Existing Contracts Present No Barriers
There remain now only the questions whether state law, existing
contracts, or longstanding practices are a bar to implementation of
the interpretation proposed here. Objections based upon state law
are easily disposed of. The suggestions embodied in this article are
based upon an interpretation of federal reclamation law. To follow
these suggestions is to implement congressional intent. To the extent
that any state law is inconsistent therewith, it is superseded by virtue
of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.
The absence of implementing contractual provisions is more inconvenient, but not fatal. It would certainly be useful to have a contract provision spelling out the details for appraisal and the manner in which incremental profits are to be recovered and used. 104
However, the absence of such specifics does not impair the right of
the United States and the district to demand of the seller that he
turn over his incremental profits. The right to be asserted exists
by virtue of federal law, not by virtue of contract. It can be vindicated in a judicial proceeding if voluntary compliance cannot be
effected. Though cumbersome, the necessary machinery for appraisal
exceptional features. The same rule is applied in the case of any property, real or
personal." Murray v. Public Util. Comm'n, 27 Idaho 603, 150 Pac. 47, 51 (1915). Parallel
sales are, of course, the best evidence of market value. l ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN § 137, at 582 (2d ed. 1953). Where such sales are unavailable, the
courts readily tum to the best evidence they can find. This may be more or less
comparable sales, Sac &: Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 340 F.2d 368, 370
(Ct. Cl. 1964), or it may be mere opinion evidence if no transactions are available to
help arrive at a price. United States v. 13255.53 Acres, 158 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir.
1946). Moreover, where no comparable sales are available, the courts can always tum
to such collateral evidence of value as the cost of obtaining an alternate supply. Village
of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397, 207 P .2d 1025 (1949).
104. It would also be useful to have had a statute expressly spelling out the policy
conclusion which this article has reached by implication from fragments here and
there. It is well known that the Department of Interior is "constantly experiencing
protests" even when it acts "to implement specific congressional requirements." Hear•
ings on S. 3162 Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962) (Testimony
of Associate Solicitor Weinberg). However, as is indicated in the concluding pages,
this is an issue without a present constituency and therefore one which may need first
to be advocated in a judicial forum.
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and recovery can be worked out in the form of a judicial decree.
Victory in a few such lawsuits might induce renegotiation of existing
contracts in order to work out a practical procedure less complicated than litigation for all parties concerned.
C. Past Administrative Practices Are Not Binding

Finally, there is the question of the effect of present a~inistrative practice. While longstanding practice is suggestive of a proper
interpretation of the law, the courts have made clear in recent years
that it is only suggestive and not binding. Error does not become
truth merely by virtue of antiquity. 105 The real question is whether
the legislature can be viewed as having approved the policy which
is being achieved by current administrative interpretation. Certainly the foregoing discussion ought to be persuasive that no such
argument is properly available in this case. The legislative history
of this problem only demonstrates that Congress has been led first
one way and then another because false issues and erroneous choices
have been put before it. Congress has never considered the interpretation proposed here.106 Since the administrative agency, the
Department of the Interior, has taken various positions at various
times in accord with its evaluation of current needs, there is no reason why it cannot vary its position once again, leaving it to Congress
to reject the choice if it desires to do so. The Department has in
the past taken a broad view of its authority to deal with incremental
values; it is time to exercise that broad authority again.
105. Administrative interpretations, however longstanding, will not and should not
stop a court from making its own determination of what Congress intended. United
States v. City &: County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31-32 (1940). Moreover, the executive agency is entitled to change its mind about ·the proper interpretation of a
statute and thus to initiate such a judicial determination. FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381
U.S. 90, 110 n.30, 113 (1965); United States v. Dupont &: Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957).
See generally 71 I.D. 498, 516-17 (1964) (Op.,Sol., Dept. Int., No. M-36675). This is not
to deny that an agency's interpretation is "entitled to great respect" where the agency
seeks to have a court confirm that interpretation. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 18
(1965). The point made here is the quite different one that an agency which desires to
change its view of a statute is not barred from doing so by its own previous interpretation to the contrary.
While it is surely true that economic expectations are based upon prerent interpretation and will be disappointed by a change, that fact is not conclusive against a
change in interpretation. See generally Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). It might, however,
suggest the desirability of applying the change prospectively only. Such an interpretation would protect vendors in sales already consummated and also banks which have
made loans with the water right as security. Ibid. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965); Griflin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. In any event, congressional inaction in the face of administrative practice,
though relevant, is never conclusive evidence of approval of such practice. Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
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VI.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

In the past, suggestions that incremental value contracts be used
have taken the form of an argument that the United States should
recapture for itself a benefit which it had formerly bestowed on its
citizens. Such an approach is obviously always an unpopular one.
The unique factor about the proposal made here is that it need
involve no such unattractive suggestion. It does not require the recapture of aid previously given. Instead, it urges that the wrong
people have been enriching themselves at the expense of their fellow
citizens. Unfortunately, however, those fellow citizens who are being
cheated are not likely to join forces and seek to vindicate their
rights. The reason is that the victims are largely the future generation of people on the projects, and the victimizers are the present
occupants. Thus, the victims are inadequately represented by the
settlers now on the projects and by the district management, which,
of course, is dra·wn from the present population.107
There is one partial exception to this problem, and it may suggest a good place to begin enforcement of the new interpretation.
On ~t least some projects-the Colorado-Big Thompson is a good
example-the future generation of buyers and users does have a
present existence. The project area is urbanizing, and the future
buyers are largely the municipalities in the project, which are acquiring water from agricultural users. It is to their benefit that incremental values be retained in the project, for project purposes,
rather than being taken away by settlers who are selling their interests in the project lands. Moreover, since they buy water rights in
gross, certain of the complex technical problems of valuation need
not be encountered. This might be a very attractive opportunity to
test the new theory.
107. As Senator Douglas has pointed out, the same sort of problem is presented by
the excess land law, where the intended beneficiaries of the law "are persons in the
future. They do not exist at present. Since they exist only in the future and not in
the present, they lack voices and are in a sense unrepresented." 108 CONG, REc. 5711
(1962).

